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Abstract: The concept of resilience embodies the quest towards the ability to sustain shocks, to suffer from 
these shocks as little as possible, for the shortest time possible, and to recover with the full functionalities 
that existed before the perturbation. We propose an operation definition of resilience, seeing it as a measure 
of stress that is complementary to the risk measures. Emphasis is put on the distinction between stressors 
(the forces acting on the system) and stress (the internal reaction of the system to the stressors). This allows 
us to elaborate a classification of stress measures and of the possible responses to stressors. We 
emphasize the need for characterizing the goals of a given system, from which the process of resilience 
build-up can be defined. Distinguishing between exogenous versus endogenous sources of stress allows 
one to define the corresponding appropriate responses. The main ingredients towards resilience include (1) 
the need for continuous multi-variable measurement and diagnosis of endogenous instabilities, (2) 
diversification and heterogeneity, (3) decoupling, (4) incentives and motivations, and (5) last but not least the 
(obvious) role of individual  strengths. Propositions for individual training towards resilience are articulated. 
The concept of “crisis flight simulators” is introduced to address the intrinsic human cognitive biases 
underlying the logic of failures and the illusion of control, based on the premise that it is only by “living” 
through scenarios and experiencing them that decision makers make progress. We also introduce the 
“time@risk” framework, whose goal is to provide continuous predictive updates on possible scenarios and 
their probabilistic weights, so that a culture of preparedness and adaptation be promoted. These concepts 
are presented towards building up personal resilience, resilient societies and resilient financial systems.
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1-INTRODUCTION
Interesting systems are out-of-equilibrium and subjected to external  influences. In biology, the only true 
equilibrium state is death. In contrast, living organisms are remarkable engines that use energy and matter to 
generate internal order and external entropy. Being coupled to some outside environment, any interesting 
biological or social systems is under the influence of fluxes, their fluctuations and trends as well as 
perturbations of various types. Under these exogenous influences, they organize endogenously, attempting 
to self-propagate, grow and invade all available niches. These systems attempt to stabilize, at least for a 
time, towards some sort of dynamical equilibrium or are managed to stay close to a desirable state. 
Nevertheless, numerous exogenous and endogenous stress-factors continuously destabilize these systems. 
An outstanding question, which is increasingly crucial  to modern human societies, is how to ensure 
survivability, sustainability, resilience as well  as promise of better well-being and happiness in the presence 
of the many present and future stress factors.
To address these questions, the originality of the present essay is to recognize the key role played by the 
concept of “stress”, which is the reaction of a system to some factors that tends to perturb it from a reference 
state. The existence of stress leads to three possible types of characteristics for a system: 
(i) fragility (system is prone to disability of its functions or even to destruction), 
(ii) robustness or resilience (system is able to recover from not-too-large stresses), and 
(iii) adaptiveness and transformation, leading to phase changes, regime shifts, modified behaviors 
and even to drastic structural reorganizations such as in biological mutations. 
In this framework, we examine in detail the claim that stress can be beneficial and show that it is subdued 
within the earlier and more general concept of “adaptive systems” according to which systems evolve 
endogenously in symbiosis with the so-called stressors. The other essential role of stress in the evolution of 
systems is to promote rare intermittent rapid speciations, such as in punctuated biological evolution. We 
show that the concept of “antifragility” recently introduced by N. Taleb describes the quality of some systems 
that are designed to profit from particular stressors that stress other systems and to which they are not 
sensitive themselves. But, these so-called “antifragile” systems also exhibit vulnerability with respect to other 
stressors that lie outside their tailored design. Many presented antifragile systems are also much less 
productive that their fragile or resilient counterparts, showing the importance of recognizing the defined 
objectives. Hence, we conclude that antifragility does not exist per se and that the concept is misleading.
The present essay provides a rigorous definition of stress in corresponding systems. We describe how to 
measure stress, how to delineate the possible responses to stressors and we spell out propositions towards 
more resilience and sustainability. We emphasize the need for specifying the goals of a given system, from 
which the process of resilience build-in can be defined. We distinguish between exogenous versus 
endogenous sources of stress, and delineate the corresponding appropriate responses. We outline the main 
ingredients of resilience in terms of (1) the need for continuous multi-variable measurements and diagnosis 
of endogenous instabilities, (2) diversification and heterogeneity, (3) decoupling, (4) incentives and 
motivations, and (5) last but not least the (obvious) role of individual  strengths. In this respect, propositions 
for individual training towards resilience are articulated. The concept of “crisis flight simulators” is introduced 
to address the intrinsic human cognitive biases underlying the logic of failures and the illusion of control, 
based on the premise that it is only by “living” through scenarios and experiencing them that decision makers 
make progress. We also introduce the “time@risk” framework, whose goal is to provide continuous predictive 
updates on possible scenarios and their probabilistic  weights, so that a culture of preparedness and 
adaptation be promoted. These concepts are presented towards building up personal resilience, resilient 
societies and resilient financial systems.
2-DEFINITIONS OF STRESS
Defining stress is the first step towards a full understanding of risks, fragility, robustness, resilience and the 
development of efficient risk management. Everybody has some familiarity with the notion of stress. 
However, in view of the widespread misunderstanding and confusion, rigorous and precise definitions are 
required. Before formulating a general  definition of stress, it is useful to present illustrations through 
examples offered by different scientific fields.
In physics and more specifically, in continuum mechanics, stress is defined as a measure of the internal 
forces acting within a deformable body. Quantitatively, we speak of a stress field defined as the ensemble of 
the stresses defined over all  points within the body. Precisely, the stress at one point is a tensor that allows 
one to determine the force per unit surface that applies on any arbitrary fictitious plane specified by its 
orientation and going through that point. In a simple cylindrical  geometry, an external force applied along the 
long axis translates within the body into a stress equal to the force divided by the area of the cylindrical 
cross-section. In equilibrium, the internal stresses sum up to balance exactly the external  forces applied to 
the system. One can state the general  result that the internal forces (and therefore stresses) are a reaction 
to external forces (stressors) applied on the body.
3
In biology, the endocrinologist pioneer, Hans Selye, introduced the concept of stress on the basis of his 
observations that many different types of substances and, more generally, perturbations applied to animals 
led to the same symptoms (see e.g., the review of Selye (1973)). The concept of stress in biology is thus 
based on the existence of non-specific  responses of the body to the demands placed upon it. Transient 
perturbations, which do not exceed the natural  regulatory capacity of the organism, lead to responses that 
ensure the resilience of homeostasis, the dynamical equilibrium characterizing living entities. In the presence 
of unrelieved stress, the body often transitions to pathological states associated with a change of 
homeostasis. This is analogous to the initial visco-elasto-plastic  response of a mechanical system to an 
external stress, followed by creep that usually ends in the tertiary rupture regime (Nechad et al., 2005). 
Several important characteristics of stress can be learnt from these examples:
1. stress is an internal response/reaction of a system to a perturbation called stressor (or stress-factor);
2. a stressor is a demand applied to the body that requires its reaction and adaptation;
3. a stressor elicits a non-specific  response regardless of the nature of the stress, and even whether the 
stressor has a positive or negative consequences in the long term. 
More generally, for biological as well as socio-economical  systems, the non-specific response or “symptoms 
of stress” to a new demand involves increased
(i) attention;
(ii) mobilization of resources;
(iii) concentration on key areas;
(iv) recovery or exhaustion of the adaptive response and transition to pathological or crisis states.
In adaptive immune systems, (i) T and B lymphocytes first recognize the dangers, then (ii) mobilize the 
generating centers of antibodies that (iii) are finally directed towards and concentrated at the loci  of insult.  In 
social systems, the three first steps of the non-specific  responses are typical of military-type intervention to 
cope with internal or external threats. In psychology, the first step (i) is associated with alarm, the second 
and third steps with resistance and the fourth step with exhaustion, as classified within the so-called general 
adaptation syndrome (Selye, 1973). More specifically, professionals facing acute situations, such as 
competitive pilots, athletes, surgeons and so on, go through the three first steps during their transient 
stressful activities. In economics, the response to economic  difficulties is associated with (i) the 
characterization of the symptoms (solvency problems, budget deficit, increase of debt), (ii) the identification 
of reserves through expense cuts and reengineering of business and risk management processes and (iii) 
the reallocation of resources on key business lines or subsidizing. These measures may lead (iv) to a 
stabilization, or to a transition to a new favorable economic  regime catalyzed by economic  reforms and 
innovations or to bankruptcies in the context of firms, or to a disruptive transition to a new political order in 
the context of nations. 
3-MEASURES OF STRESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
In mechanics, direct measurements of stress within a system are often performed by observations of 
deformations of the body. In biology, the measurement of stress is obtained by observing the response of the 
biological processes to a stressor. More generally, in natural sciences, one often has the luxury of observing 
the stresses by their direct effects. In social sciences, the feedback loops as well as coupling mechanisms to 
exogenous factors are much less understood. As a consequence of the complexity of social systems, the 
quantification of the stress level is performed indirectly via probabilistic  approaches that introduce metrics of 
risks and/or resilience. These indirect ways of stress measurement in social sciences may be at the origin of 
the confusion in dealing with the concept of stress, incorrectly interpreted not as an internal response of the 
system to stressors but as the source of difficulties faced by the system.
3.1 Risk as measure of stress
Formally, risk is defined as the triplet of
1. a probability when available, or a level  of uncertainty, or in the worst situation the formulation of 
the ambiguity corresponding to ask the question on the possibility for the occurrence of certain 
stressors; 
2. a potential loss quantifying the possible impacts of the stressor;
3. a vulnerability and related counter-measures and mitigation techniques, that specify how 
disruptive is the potential stressor to the system. 
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The two first properties characterize the external forces or stressors that may influence the system. Together 
with the third property, which is specific to the system, they control  the overall losses that the stressor can 
bring to the system. As a consequence, risk is understood as the combination of these three characteristics 
of the potential stressor. Thus, risk is equal  or proportional to the possible internal response of the system, 
and therefore is a proxy for the stress developing within the system.
The simplest response of a system to a normal  stress is non-specific and non-directional, which is 
comparable with the biological  concept of kinesis. More resilient systems need to develop targeted reactions 
to stress, which is analogous to taxis in biology, defined as a directional response of a system to a stimulus 
or stimulus gradient intensity. In this sense, “stress taxis” can be defined as a response that, in the end, 
tends to unload stress off the system. For example, bacteria are wonderfully evolved organisms that 
demonstrate incredibly high resilience by using taxis and their corresponding simple behavioral rules.
3.2 Resilience as measure of stress
Resilience comes into several levels. The first two levels of resilience can be conveniently classified by using 
the theory of dynamical systems. 
First level  of resilience. Resilience is often defined as the speed of return to equilibrium (or more generally to 
the attractor characterizing the system) following a perturbation (Pimm and Lawton, 1977). Technically, the 
first level  of resilience is referred to as “engineering resilience”, which is a local  concept. Engineering 
resilience is described by a local analysis, in terms of the stability of the linearized dynamics in the 
neighborhood of the equilibrium point. Indeed, resilience in this sense refers first to the stability of the 
equilibrium state, which occurs when all  Lyapunov exponents are negative. Then, the speed of return to the 
equilibrium point is controlled by the largest (negative) Lyapunov exponent (i.e., the smallest one in absolute 
value). 
Second level of resilence. In contrast, “ecological resilience” encompasses and generalizes engineering 
resilience by referring to the non-local dynamics occurring within the basin of attraction of the equilibrium 
state, defined as the set of initial  conditions of the system that converge to that equilibrium state. While 
engineering resilience is a local concept quantifying the response of the system to small perturbations, 
ecological resilience describes the fact that a system state will return to its initial  equilibrium as long as the 
perturbations remain within the basin of attraction of the equilibrium point, thus embodying non-local finite 
size perturbations that can be as large as the size of the basin of attraction itself, but not larger. 
Walker et al. (2004) review four main components of ecological resilience of a system in its capacity to 
absorb disturbance and reorganize itself in order to retain essentially the same function. Using the dynamical 
system analogy with attractors and their basins of attraction, these four components are: 
(i) latitude (controlled by the size of the basin of attraction), 
(ii) resistance (controlled by the height of the barriers between attractors), 
(iii) precariousness (controlled by the current position of the system within the basin of attraction),
 (iv) and panarchy (controlled by the way the attractor structure and its basin may change as a 
function of the scale of description through cross-scale interactions) (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). 
Extending the so-called resilience triangle approach (private communication of Wolfgang Kroger, ETH 
Zurich), see e.g. (Bruneau et al., 2003; Chang and Shinozuka, 2004; Pant and Barker, 2012), one can 
simplify the picture offered by ecological resilience by introducing four variables characterizing the response 
of a system to an external shock. Considering the variable W0 corresponding to a reference capacity, wealth 
or production level just before the shock, we define
 (i) the maximum loss (1-λ)W0, 
 (ii) a characteristic time τ1 of reaction to reach the bottom level λ W0,
(iii) the level Λ W0 recovered 
(iv) after the characteristic recovery time τ2.
In this simplified formulation, the resilience of the system is captured by the quadruplet of parameters (λ, τ1, 
Λ, τ2). Note that Λ could be larger than 1, corresponding to the situation where the shock has long-term 
beneficial effects by increasing the overall  performance above the initial  baseline W0. Some systems may be 
characterize by Λ being smaller than λ , in which case, after a first loss of performance over a first reaction 
time τ1, the system degrades further over a possibly different time scale τ2 to an even worse situation. We 
should also stress that the quadruplet (λ, τ 1, Λ , τ 2) may not be unique but depend on the severity and 
duration (as well  as possibly other characteristics) of the shock, so as to reflect the nature and amplitude of 
possible cascades occurring within the system.
Third level of resilience. The concept of viability (Aubin, 1991; Deffuant and Gilbert, 2011) extends further the 
idea by focusing on the conditions that the system must obey to remain “viable”, for instance functional  or 
alive. These constraints may not in general map precisely onto the set of attractors of the dynamics or may 
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not even be attainable by the natural  evolution of the dynamics and therefore may require continuous 
external management and control. 
Fourth level of resilience. The dynamical  system analogy has however its limit if taken too rigidly, because it 
fails to account for the fact that many biological, ecological  and social systems may actually adapt, evolve 
and even transform fundamentally under the influence of stressors (Walker et al., 2004). This requires the 
consideration of other levels of resilience, which takes into account the possibility for the system to adapt its 
constituents so as to influence its resilience. This may correspond to a deformation of the basin of attraction, 
the fusion of initially distinct basins and other topological  transformations. More generally, the dynamical 
system may incorporate stochastic  components, such as deterministic, quasi-periodic or even random 
deformations of the attractors due to the modulation of some control  parameters, as long as the conditions of 
viability are respected. Then, the system keeps its identity, but in a broader sense, even redefining itself 
while still keeping its ability to cope with the stressors. Pushed to the extreme, the system may even 
transform itself into a completely different structure via its capacity to evolve, as described by the theory of 
complex adaptive systems (Holland, 1975; Kauffman, 1993).
These considerations underline that the concept of resilience is dependent on the time scale over which the 
stressors act. For short-lived disturbances compared with the characteristic time scales of reactions of the 
system, engineering and ecological resiliences are the relevant levels of description. At intermediate time 
scales, the issue of viability dominates, pushing for adaptation and redefinition of goals and processes. At 
the longest time scales, transformations may occur that are similar to natural  selection and Darwinist 
evolution of species, seen as a transformation in response to changing geological and climatic conditions. In 
the context of man-made and social systems, Darwinist evolution is also relevant to understand the 
dynamics of human enterprises (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hite and Hesterly, 2001). Real life situations 
are likely to involve an interplay between a continuum of different time scales and thus between the different 
levels of resilience.
3.3 Links between risk and resilience as complementary measures of stress
To summarize, risk and resilience are two complementary revelations of stress. On the one hand, risk 
provides a measure of the nature and amplitude of stressors, present and future. As a consequence, from 
risk measurements, one can infer the possible level of stress that may develop within the system. On the 
other hand, resilience characterizes the internal stress response within the system, quantified by the capacity 
of a system to cope with stressors and remain essentially the same. In other words, resilience is the amount 
of stress that a system can bear without a considerable transformation. 
Risk and resilience are inter-connected in another way through the concept of vulnerability. On the one hand, 
vulnerability is part of risk, as a quantification of the potential  amount of losses that are specific  to a given 
system. But this vulnerability depends on the structural and adaptive properties of the system that make it 
either more prone to losses or less vulnerable via better mitigation techniques. In this sense, vulnerability 
constructs a bridge between risk and resilience. The processes favoring resilience will  tend to decrease 
vulnerability and vice-versa. 
The duality of stress expression in risk versus resilience is also apparent in the different possible responses 
of the system to stressors. These responses can be classified into three main classes: (i) fight, (ii) fly and (iii) 
transform. 
(i) “Fight” is the typical  response under relatively small risk and large resilience, which are associated with 
“normal” stress developing within the system. The “fight” response can be characterized by negative 
feedback loops tending to stabilize the system around its previous state, such as in the homeostasis state 
of living biological entities. 
(ii) In contrast, the “fly” response corresponds to systems where risks and resilience are at comparable 
levels so that there is significant hazard for the system. By avoidance strategies, or some adaptation 
without major transformations and/or improvement of management, resilience can be improved so that the 
stressors can be addressed in order to ensure the preservation of the system identity. 
(iii) Finally, when risk is large and resilience is insufficient, “extreme” stress develops within the system. 
Other than its demise, its survival requires considerable transformations of the system itself via the 
activation of positive feedbacks that drives it towards a new state.
The rational  response to the presence of risks (the potential stressors and corresponding stress of the 
system) would seem logically to strive for always increasing resilience (the stress that the system can bear). 
However, there is always a cost-benefit balance between two extremes, the laissez-faire attitude of no 
investment in resilience as one extreme, and extreme risk aversion leading to attempts to over-control at the 
other. Building up resilience requires indeed to increase reserves, develop excess capacity, construct 
alternative supply chains, ensure redundancy, as well  as investing in continuous education and training. But 
modern optimizing firms and societies work with the just-in-time philosophy and the constraint of ever 
lowering costs. This is often an impediment for building up resilience, as many examples show (Sheffi, 
6
2005). It is a general  observation that management in social  systems strives to optimize this cost-benefit 
conflict, however, with often limited or even disappointing results to show for. In contrast, it is remarkable that 
natural systems often tend to evolve, converge and operate close to states that exhibit such a balance. 
These states are referred to in the modern literature as “self-organized critical” (Bak, 1996) or “at the edge of 
chaos” (Kauffman, 1993). This describes the tendency for coupled entities that interact over many repetitive 
actions to function close to a bifurcation point separating states that are too stable, from other states that are 
too unstable. A typical  example is the human brain, for which there is a growing consensus that it operates 
close to or even functions at a critical  point (Chialvo, 2006; Levina et al., 2007; Meisel et al., 2012; Plenz, 
2012), separating a sub-critical state from a super-critical one. In the critical state, the brain exhibits the 
largest possible reactivity to novel  external  stimuli while, at the same time, showing stability of memory and 
other functional  properties. If the brain was in the subcritical  state, it would learn less efficiently by being not 
malleable enough and would be too slow to react in crucial situations. If the brain was in the supercritical 
state, its neural network would fire too much and too often, oscillating between extreme activity and 
exhaustion. Such a pathological state is actually found in epileptic  patients (Osorio et al., 2010). In natural 
and biological systems, there are in general  strong negative feedback mechanisms to stabilize the system 
and poise it at an optimal point between costly increase of resilience and costly neglect of the looming risks 
(Scheffer, 2009). The balance corresponds to a merging of the two responses - “fight” and “fly” - so that the 
system may combine both negative feedback reactions as well  as adaptation to remain at the “edge of 
chaos”. 
In social systems, there is a lot of lip service paid to the goal  for managers and policy makers to obtain this 
kind of optimal state. Actually, there is often an illusion of control  (Langer, 1975; Satinover and Sornette, 
2007; 2011) that it is possible to remove most of the risks and obtain an ideal  state of resilience. One 
argument for the insufficient resilience of social  systems (Diamond, 2004) is that, due to their complexity, 
they have not had the time to evolve (Walker et al., 2004) by the forces of “natural selection”. This may be a 
part of the truth. However, we note that, for some social systems such as financial  markets, there is ample 
evidence of an absence of convergence towards a stable dynamics, but rather the existence of persistent 
cycles of bubbles and bursts (Kindleberger, 2005; Sornette, 2003), notwithstanding experiencing many crises 
that, one would surmise, would have enabled investors to learn and avoid the next one (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2011). One possible explanation can be found in the incentives of investors to maximize their return on short 
time scales, leading to recurrent instabilities (Minsky, 2008). More generally, in many social systems, there is 
the ubiquitous problem that the short-term incentives are often not aligned with the long-term ones. This is 
associated with hyperbolic  discounting (Laibson, 1998), which describes the general exaggerated preference 
for smaller immediate rather than larger delayed gratifications. Similarly, the incentives at the individual  agent 
level are often incompatible with those at the society level, leading to social dilemmas (Kerr, 1983). It is also 
associated with the so-called public good problem and the problem of fostering social cooperation in 
particular in the context of socio-ecological systems (Ostrom, 1990). The rest of this essay aims at 
characterizing the conditions for breaking these kinds of stalemate. 
4-CAN STRESS BE BENEFICIAL?
When thinking about stress, a first attitude is to find ways of reducing it or, when not possible, of developing 
passive and/or active defenses. But, there is a growing recognition that moderate levels of stress may be 
actually beneficial, both for health and for performance (Weiten and Lloyd, 2005; Hosenpud and  Greenberg, 
2006; Ritsner, 2010; Contrada and Baum, 2010). Is stress really beneficial per se?
4.1 System-stressor co-evolution under normal stress
For passive systems, stress is in general destructive, as in creep of materials where microscopic  tiny 
damage events accumulate and lead to global rupture. In contrast, active systems can detect stress and use 
it as a guiding signal on the way towards better fitness to novel conditions. Thus, random or intended 
stressors are usable for the
(i) identification of the characteristics of stress by listening and analyzing reactions of the system to 
perturbations; 
(ii) measurement of stress: (a) risks (observation of event probabilities, losses, vulnerability of the 
system) and (b) resilience (“exploration” of the stability landscape characterized by its latitude, 
resistance, precariousness and panarchy); 
(iii) catalysis of learning, which promotes changes occurring through feedback mechanisms by 
adaptation towards better fitness under changing conditions, and of selection of specific features and 
implementation of contra-measures;
(iv) excitation of the system readiness, maintaining an engaged, interested and concerned state (in the 
spirit of the Soviet Union pioneer’s motto “Always Ready!”).
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In section 2, we identified that symptoms of stress in a system include attention, mobilization of resources, 
concentrations on key areas, and so on. This may be viewed as positive consequences of stress for the 
function of the system. But, these changes are actually occurring at a cost, in particular that of a loss of 
resilience because the allocation of resources to cope with the stressor makes the system more vulnerable 
to other stressors. Thus, the optimization to cope with a first stressor should not be seen necessarily as a 
benefit of the stress. In general, optimization processes and coping with stress (or strengthening resilience) 
should be disconnected. 
We also need to mention the cases in which some stress can be caused by a “positive” stress-factor (termed 
“Eustress” by Selye (1973)). For example, an eustress could be an economic  reform that, after a period of 
adaptation, would lead to increased economic growth. Or, an extraordinary good news (learning about the 
return of a lost one or winning a huge lottery sum) may induce strong stress in the person. Again, it is not 
stress itself that is beneficial. Stress is a signal of a change of conditions and is a “guide” on the way towards 
adaptation or transformation to better fit to the new conditions, so that a system can survive and benefit from 
them.
Many situations where stress is argued to be beneficial, which we are going to cover at least partially in the 
following, follow the same archetype in which the system under consideration has co-evolved with the stress. 
In other words, the system is within an environment in which stress is unavoidable. Stress seems to be 
beneficial simply because the raison d’être of the system or of some of its key properties is precisely to cope 
and live with the ambient stress. Therefore, it is almost a tautology to find that the system needs stress or 
benefits from stress because it becomes dysfunctional  if one of its main inputs, stress, is absent. We can 
therefore state that stress, at least up to a certain level  smaller than the system resilience, is part of the 
normal system function and we refer to this situation as “normal stress”.
4.2 Adapted systems co-evolved with their stressors
In this section, we provide several examples illustrating the concept that so-called beneficial  stress occurs 
when the system under consideration has co-evolved with the stress.
 4.2.1 Mammal immune systems, bones and muscles
Biology and medicine have probably been the first disciplines to recognize the co-evolved nature of stressors 
and of the stresses that develop within living systems. The immune system of mammals, in particular, 
provides arguably the best example illustrating what could be referred to with perhaps some exaggeration as 
a symbiosis between stressors (antigens) and system (antibodies). We underline that the example of the 
immune system provides a particularly important illustration, since its main role is indeed to defend the 
organism against disruptive intrusions by pathogens, in particular, which would like to exploit the organism 
for their own propagation. Consider first other types of homeostasis control  processes in which the target 
variables are kept in a narrow optimal range with small fluctuations. This describes the “stable” homeostasis 
control  for the regulation of the amounts of water and minerals by osmoregulation in the kidneys, the removal 
of metabolic  waste by excretory organs such as the kidneys and lungs, the regulation of body temperature, 
the regulation of blood glucose level by the liver and the insulin secreted by the pancreas, and so on. In 
contrast, “The (immune) system never settles down to a steady-state, but rather, constantly changes with 
local flare ups and storms, and with periods of relative quiescence” as quoted in (Perelson, 2002), and see 
also (Perelson and Weisbuch, 1997; Nelson and Perelson, 2002). These flares can be understood as 
transient nonlinear reactions to fluctuating exogenous stressors as well as to expressions of the internal 
stress states. A growing body of literature indeed suggests that the incessant “attacks” by antigens of many 
different forms have forced the immune system to develop continuing fight and adaptation processes to 
ensure the integrity of the body (see Sornette et al. (2009b) for a review and mathematical  modeling). In this 
vein, the ‘hygiene hypothesis’ (Schaub  et al. 2006) states that modern medicine and sanitation may give rise 
to an under-stimulated and subsequently overactive immune system that is responsible for high incidences 
of immune-related ailments such as allergy and autoimmune diseases. In this view, infections and 
unhygienic  contact may confer protection against the development of allergic  illnesses. For instance, 
Bollinger et al. (2007) suggested that the hygiene hypothesis may explain the increased rate of appendicitis 
(∼6% incidence) in industrialized countries, in relation to the important immune-related function of the 
appendix. Sornette et al. (2009) concluded that, if the regulatory immune system was not continuously 
subjected to stressors, its adaptive component would decay in part and the defense would go down, thus 
letting the organism becoming vulnerable to future bursts of pathogen fluxes. They developed a 
mathematical model that demonstrates that the correct point of reference is not a microbe-free body (no 
stressors), but a highly dynamical  homeostatic immune system within a homeostatic body under the impact 
of fluxes of pathogens and of other stressors (which include microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, 
parasites, environmental  load, over-work, overeating and other excesses, psychological and emotional 
factors such as anger, fear, sadness, and so on). The situation is analogous to the maintenance of healthy 
bones and muscles of a human being. For astronauts under zero-gravity (no weight stressor), loss of bone 
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and muscle, cardiovascular deconditioning, loss of red blood cells and plasma, possible compromise of the 
immune system, and finally, an inappropriate interpretation of otolith system signals all  occur, with no 
appropriate counter-measures yet known (Young, 1999). In other words, for bones and muscles, stress (in 
the real mechanical sense of the term!) is needed to avoid degenerescence and ensure appropriate strength 
in cases of need. In all these examples, stress is beneficial only because the systems are fundamentally 
defined in their aims and properties by their interactions with stressors. Biological  evolution has weaved a 
complex network of interacting feedback loops that entangled fundamentally the systems with their stressors, 
making the later necessary for the normal function of the former.
 4.2.2 Human cooperation, competition and risk taking
An enormous body of anthropological and ethnographic literature demonstrates that the level of cooperation 
between humans is exceptional both in quality and quantity (Henrich and Henrich, 2007), which explains the 
remarkable success of this single mammal  species that nowadays controls a major part of the whole output 
of planet Earth (Steffen et al., 2004). However, the origin of this cooperation is still  quoted as one of the 25 
most compelling puzzles that science is facing today (Siegfried, 2005). Many mechanisms and contextual 
factors have been proposed to explain the remarkable level of pro-social  behavior and cooperation between 
humans, such as kin selection, inclusive fitness, reciprocity, network reciprocity, group-level and multi-level 
selection, other-regarding preferences, relative income preferences, envy, inequality aversion and altruism 
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Two essential  ingredients emerge: (i) the presence of differences in skills, 
contributions, rewards and retributions among group members and (ii) how perceptions and preferences 
drive human decisions and actions. In other words, not only exogenous stressors resulting from the 
environment such as predators but also within-group stressors have been found essential to promote 
cooperation. This has led to a significantly higher survival efficiency and larger fitness both for the group and 
for the individuals. Using agent-based models and analytical  theory, Hetzer and Sornette (2011; 2012) in 
particular have shown that cooperation evolves at the level documented for humans only under two 
conditions:  (i) agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion, which is found to be evolutionary dominant 
and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding 
preferences; (ii) groups are “stressed” by random perturbations in the form of strangers migrating between 
co-evolving groups and who introduce different cooperation levels than those that would emerge from the 
group consensus in absence of the random perturbations. The underlying mechanism is related to the 
Parrondo effect describing situations where losing strategies or deleterious effects can combine to win 
(Harmer and Abbott, 2002; Abbott, 2002). Here, the random behavior is rooted in the exchange between 
groups and the asymmetry is inscribed in the punishment rule driven by disadvantageous inequity aversion. 
This constitutes a telling example illustrating that stressors have selected for enhanced cooperation via 
higher survival rates for groups and individuals. This became possible when cognitive abilities in our homo 
ancestors increased sufficiently to allow the exploitation of this new “resource” of enhanced cooperation 
beyond that observed for our primate cousins, again illustrating the co-evolution between stressors and 
system’s abilities.
Another important characteristic of humans is that high male-male competition for reproductive success has 
been permeating the history of modern humans (200'000 years ago to recent times) and has contributed 
through gene-culture coevolution to create gender competitiveness-related differences. Favre and Sornette 
(2012) have recently introduced a simple agent-based model  that explains the high level of male-male 
competition and risk taking as rooted in the unequal biological costs of reproduction between males and 
females. This cost asymmetry has promoted females’ choosy selection of alpha-males who have better 
chance to propagate genes via the natural selection of the fittest (Baumeister, 2010; Ogas and Gaddami). 
This causes male-male competition and male's arm race for signaling their qualities, which takes the form of 
stronger risk-taking behavior (Diamond, 2002). This further cascades into higher male than female death 
rates through risky signaling and results in a smaller male than female effective breeding population, both 
because females select a subset of males for reproduction and because of male's higher death rate. 
Remarkably, this mechanism can be checked quantitatively through its prediction for the ratio of the Time To 
the Most Recent Common Ancestor (TMRCA) based on human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), i.e. female-to-
female transmitted, which is estimated to be twice that based on the non-recombining part of the Y 
chromosome (NRY), i.e. male-to-male transmitted.  It appears that we are all  descended from males who 
were successful in a highly competitive context, while females were facing a much weaker female-female 
competition. Stresses have appeared endogenously in the human population as a response to the unequal 
biological costs of reproduction (itself a stressor), leading to males’ arm race in risk taking (another set of 
stressors) and cascaded into extraordinary implications for the development of the human species and its 
conquer of the world (Baumeister, 2010). One can argue that the high level  of risk taking of human males 
have been beneficial  for mankind, through the exploration of unknown territories and the development of 
inventions, in the end making stressors, via enhanced risk-taking by males, the engine of progress. The 
causal  flow “reproduction inequality =>  female strategy =>  male risk taking” of stressors can thus be seen 
as an intrinsic  part of the making of mankind, providing another example of the entangled nature of the 
human system and its stressors, the later being beneficial on the long term as a result of their co-existence 
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and co-evolution. Pushing this reasoning, one can thus conclude that being human is to use one’s superior 
cognitive abilities to take risks beyond the biological laws that enslave other animals.
4.3 Change of regimes under extreme stress
Nature and human societies exhibit many cases in history and in recent times when stress surpasses the 
resilience level of the system. We refer to such response of the system as “extreme stress” because of 
dramatic consequences it may lead to. Sources of extreme stress can be tracked using the measures of 
stress that were described above - risk and resilience - and include:
(i) extreme possible stressors that are characterized by low probability and/or huge losses, for 
example, very rare events of enormous impact or previously unknown events (black swans (Taleb, 
2007));
(ii) unbearable stress that the system is not capable of coping with, showing extreme vulnerabilities 
(for example, disfunction of critical systems) and/or zero resilience, when even a tiny perturbation 
can lead to a change of regime. Examples of such systems include those (1) optimized to the 
edge of maximum efficiency, such as the just-in-time Toyota supply chain and inventory 
management system and (2) close to a tipping point due to developed endogenous instabilities, 
leading to dragon-kings (Sornette and Ouillon, 2012).
In the worst cases, this leads to the death or demise of the corresponding organism or system, as for 
instance documented by J. Diamond (2004) for human societies. In other situations, the system evolves to 
another regime, in which different properties that were dormant come into play or novel  ones are forced to 
evolve for the survival and success of the system.
 The following two subsections examine a number of real  life examples illustrating the occurrence of 
regime shifts and evolution under extreme stress. 
 4.3.1 Biological and other transitions
The existence of changes of states promoted by extreme conditions is perhaps best incarnated by biological 
evolution. Contrarily to the initial  view held by Darwin that evolution is generally smooth and continuous, 
occurring by the cumulative effect of gradual  transformations, the theory of punctuated equilibrium in 
evolutionary biology describes the evolution of species as a sequence of stable states punctuated by rare 
and rapid events of branching speciations occurring under the stresses resulting from climatic, geographic 
and other possible evolutionary stressors (Gould and Eldredge, 1993). Since its introduction (Eldredge and 
Gould, 1972), this theory has received strong empirical support (Gould, 2002; Lyne and Howe, 2007). It 
holds that most species exhibit little evolutionary change for most of their geological  history, being adapted to 
their niches. But, something happens, such as an extreme disturbance, that pushes the species to branch 
into novel species, often with the demise or altogether change of the original species. 
Many scientists view the abrupt changes occurring in the sequence of punctuated equilibria as due to 
catastrophic  causes, such as the famous Chicxulub asteroid (Schulte et al., 2010) or enormous volcanic 
eruptions in the so-called Deccan trap epoch (Courtillot and McClinton, 2002), or both (Archibald et al., 2010) 
ending the reign of the mighty dinosaurs about 65 millions years ago. Starting with Bak and Sneppen (1993), 
others have argued for an endogenous origin, using the analogy with the concept of self-organized criticality 
(Bak and Paczuski, 1995; Bak, 1996; Jensen, 1998; Sornette, 2004, chapter 15). According to complex 
system theory, out-of-equilibrium slowly driven systems with threshold dynamics relax through a hierarchy of 
avalanches of all sizes. Accordingly, extreme events can also be endogenous. 
The exogenous versus endogenous explanations may actually represent two complementary view points 
since, in reality, they are often entangled. Indeed, how can one assert with 100% confidence that a given 
extreme event is really due to an endogenous self-organization of the system, rather than to the response to 
an external shock? Most natural  and social systems are indeed continuously subjected to external 
stimulations, noises, shocks, stress, forces and so on, which can widely vary in amplitude. It is thus not clear 
a priori  if a given large event is due to a strong exogenous shock, to the internal  dynamics of the system, or 
maybe to a combination of both. Sornette et al. have advanced the hypothesis that specific  dynamical 
signatures of precursors occurring before and relaxations following extreme events lead to a classification of 
possible regimes and the possibility to resolve the endo-exo conundrum. This applies broadly to many 
complex systems (Sornette and Helmstetter, 2003; Sornette, 2005), for which it is fundamental to understand 
the relative importance of self-organization versus external forcing, as documented for financial shocks 
(Sornette et al., 2003), commercial  sales (Sornette et al., 2004), and for the dynamics of fame of YouTube 
videos (Crane and Sornette, 2008). More generally, in addition to biological extinctions such as the 
Cretaceous/Tertiary KT boundary (meteorite versus extreme volcanic activity versus self-organized critical 
extinction cascades), this question applies to commercial successes (progressive reputation cascade versus 
the result of a well  orchestrated advertisement), immune system deficiencies (external viral/bacterial 
infections versus internal  cascades of regulatory breakdowns), the aviation industry recession (9/11 versus 
structural endogenous problems), discoveries (serendipity versus the outcome of slow endogenous 
maturation processes), cognition and brain learning processes (role of external inputs versus internal  self-
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organization and reinforcements) and recovery after wars (internally generated (civil  wars) versus imported 
from the outside) and so on. In economics, endogeneity versus exogeneity has been hotly debated for 
decades. A prominent example is the theory of Schumpeter on the importance of technological 
discontinuities in economic  history. Schumpeter (1942) argued that “evolution is lopsided, discontinuous, 
disharmonious by nature... studded with violent outbursts and catastrophes... more like a series of 
explosions than a gentle, though incessant, transformation.” 
 4.3.2 Political and economic transitions
Consider the fall of the Berlin wall in October 1990 associated with a series of radical  political changes in the 
Eastern Bloc. Over the period from 1989 to 1992, many east european countries engaged in a transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a democratic  and market economy. Using agent-based model 
simulations and economic data, Yaari  et al. (2008) discovered that all  countries’ GDP (gross domestic 
product) as well as other indicators of economic  development (such as the number of privately owned 
enterprises) evolved through a generic J-curve, corresponding to a first phase of strong decay followed by a 
recovery and, for some countries, a transition to a growth rate surpassing significantly the levels under 
socialism before 1990. The first decay arch of the J-curve corresponds to the progressive demise of the “old 
centrally planned economy”, whose shrinkage dominates the rise of the “new” free market economy (Novak 
et al., 2000). The second rising arch of the J-curve embodies the progressive transition to the “new 
economy” that burgeons as a response to novel conditions (Challet et al., 2009). In the case of Poland, Yaari 
et al. (2008) found that the new economy principally developed around a few singular “growth centers” 
associated with pre-existing higher education poles, which was followed by a diffusion process to the rest of 
the country. The centers of education were thus the main engines of the resilience and adaptability of the 
Polish nation to the new conditions. In contrast, other east european nations, such as Ukraine or even 
Russia, have fared much less well (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009): for them, the transition resulted in a long 
lasting economic crisis that only recently has started to show observable improvement. 
Let us scrutinize the economic transition in Russia. For a decade since the Berlin wall event, Russian GDP 
has been declining, with continuing huge drops in output and high levels of inflation. Russia went through a 
Great Depression more severe than that in the U.S. in the 1930s, with a decline in industrial production of 
over 60% from 1992 to 1998 (vs. some 35% decline in the U.S. Great Depression from 1929 to 1933), 
leading among many woes to the destruction of agriculture, deteriorating social conditions, health, education, 
environment, law, science and technology, high inflation and the destruction of the middle-class which is 
often the guardian of, as well as condition for, a functioning democracy. The Russian economy has been 
characterized over this time period as being riddled with crime and corruption. The transition was not to a 
market economy but rather to a criminalized economy, where the criminals established their own institutions 
in a process of self-organization (Intrilligator, 1998). The reasons for these problems have been identified 
(Intriligator, 1997; 1998): by endorsing a stabilization program of the russian economy based on liberalization 
of prices and the privatization of enterprises, the Yeltsin administration neglected the well-known but often 
forgotten fact that free markets requires strong institutions, and in particular a legal system, courts, lawyers, 
law enforcement; property rights, and so on, so that business contracts are enforced rather than subjected to 
the whim of the strongest. Moreover, a strong government is at the core of market economies, as shown by 
numerous anthropological  and historical studies documented for instance in (Graeber, 2011). Russia’s 
transition illustrates that externally imposed conditions, fundamental internal  situations as well as a badly 
chosen design of governance (without institutions and working legal system) led to a new regime that has 
struggled for a very long time to recover and establish a functional state for the well-being of the people 
(Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009).
The so-called Arab spring that began in Dec. 2010 constitutes another telling illustration of our thesis. This 
revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests occurred in the Arab world, leading to the ousting of the 
leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and civil uprising in other neighboring countries. While media 
reports and scholars have often viewed the Arab Spring movements as positive steps towards more 
democratic  governance, some skepticism is in order when examining the post-Gaddafi  outcome in Libya for 
instance. Research at the NECSI (necsi.edu) suggests persuasively that the triggering factor for many if not 
most of the upheaval movements observed in arab as well  as other poor countries around the world coincide 
with rapid and large rises of food prices (Lagi et al., 2011; Bertrand et al, 2012). Indeed, commodity prices 
more than doubled in 2008 due to a combination of environmental factors, the accelerating needs of 
booming countries such as China as well as speculation (Sornette et al., 2009a). As a consequence, world 
food prices skyrocketed, making many households’ subsistence reach a crisis level. The inability of the 
governments of the concerned countries to cope with these stressors led to the transitions (or in many other 
cases to the search for the resolution of quite unstable states) to what can still  be seen as evolving situations 
in search of an equilibrium. Whether the outcomes in Libya or Egypt are positive remains to be determined 
as the region has become very unstable and the future remains highly stressful and uncertain for most of the 
population. 
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This is reminiscent of the french revolution of 1789: more than enlightenment ideals, economic  factors 
arguably played indeed a crucial  role. As a result of bad harvest over most of the decade preceding 1789, a 
large part of the french population was exposed to strongly rising bread prices (the main food), leading to 
hunger and malnutrition. In the absence of adequate reactions by the government to the climate stresses 
that were adding to a very large national  debt and an antiquated tax system weighting unfairly on the working 
class, the resulting discontent population became prone to push for major changes that culminated with the 
storming of the Bastille. Similarly to the situations resulting from the Arab spring, one should be cautious to 
claim that the extraordinary changes resulting from the food price stressors (among others) have always and 
systematically been for the better in all dimensions. The situation is perhaps best captured by the apocryphal 
statement of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai during President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972: 
“too early to say” when referring to the assessment of the implications of the French revolution (he was in 
fact probably referring to the turmoil in France in May 1968 (Campbell, 2011)). Notice also that there is clear 
evidence that the French revolution has led to much bloodier wars in which whole nations have become 
involved in large scale conflicts involving many casualties (Cederman et al., 2011), showing again the 
relativity of the values of the regime shifts and their often unintended consequences.
These examples have illustrated two main points:
(i) the ubiquity of (rare) regime shifts due to the combination of abnormally large external 
circumstances (that are bound to occur in any nonlinear system if one waits long enough) and 
internal facilitating processes limiting the build-up of adequate resilience;
(ii) the value (in terms of economic consequences, change of well-being, moral level, culture) of 
regime shifts is open to debate, depends on the time horizon (beneficial short-term but detrimental 
long-term, or vice-versa) and is arguably relative;
All  the examples treated in this subsection refer to situations in which scholars and observers would rate the 
pre-existing regimes as (to various degrees) undemocratic, oppressive and in opposition with the 
enlightenment ideals. As we shall  elaborate in section 5 on recipes for resilience, much of the strength of a 
nation rests on the cohesion between its citizens that is called upon at times of stresses. In this respect, arab 
countries, the countries of the Soviet block, and France under the Bourbon dynasty developed modes of 
governance that embodied the roots of their demise, such as increased inequity and rigidities. One should 
not develop however the impression that this situation is a unique attribute of countries that do not embrace 
the modern western version of market economy and of democracy (which, by the way, is not a unique 
governance process of course but comes in many kinds and degrees). 
Consider the situation of the largest western economies, including the United States of America, Japan and 
western Europe, whose indebtedness have reached, according to many analysts and pundits, unsustainable 
levels (Reinhardt and Rogoff, 2011). Scenarios for the next decades encompass the possibility for global 
critical transitions at worst or, at least, the need for massive readjustment of expectations (which is a polite 
way to say that retirees will get much less and after working significantly longer, average social coverage will 
shrink much further, standard of livings will at best plateau with many signs of deterioration for the median 
household). Here again, one can argue that the western economic  systems have been build on a model  of 
run-away indebtedness that, on the “short term” of the past several decades, brought extraordinary gains, at 
the cost of increasing systemic and global risks (Sornette and Woodard, 2010). The on-going crisis of debt-
strangled european nations is far from finished, as nothing has been done in depth to address the problems 
of insufficient growth of productivity and innovations (Sornette, 2010), of the demographic  bottleneck, and of 
reigning on wasteful over-spending beyond one’s means by addicted consumers as well as nations spoiled 
by the failure of democracy replaced by demagogic politics (Gore, 2007). The US should not be forgotten 
either, if only because its financial system is effectively bankrupt, but held artificially alive by rounds of buying 
toxic  assets by the Federal Reserve and the successive spells of so-called quantitative easing. An even 
greater crisis if possible is probably awaiting Japan, which relies on the policy of essentially zero-interest rate 
in order to cope with a total debt that dwarfs that of all other nations. The policy of ultra-low interest rate 
seems to become the new reference point of debt-strangled nations in order to be able to honor their interest 
payments, which yet not fully appreciated consequences concerning the transfer of wealth between 
generations and the possibility to face the huge retirement liabilities. Globally, the diagnosis is clear: these 
systems have built economic  organizations that contain in themselves the seeds for monstrous systemic 
instabilities towards major re-organizations. The 2008 US crisis and the 2010-2012 sovereign european debt 
crisis are probably nothing but the premises of much more significant crises at the global  scale. Such a 
prediction is warranted on the observation that none of the real causes of the crises have been addressed 
and only superficial short-term remedies have been offered until now (Mauldin and Tepper, 2011; see also 
chapter 10 of Sornette (2003) which is based on Johansen and Sornette (2001) and, more recently Akaev et 
al. (2012)).
Thus, we can add to the two points (i) and (ii) above a third one: 
(iii) social and political systems seem to be intrinsically unstable on the long term, building up 
internally the mechanisms of increasing vulnerabilities via the very processes that seem initially 
the most favorable. 
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Resilience is therefore a fundamental  question that needs to take into account both the conflicts between 
time scales (generations) and the unintended consequences of short-term innovations and improvements 
(Ferguson, 2011).
4.4 Debunking “anti-fragility”
It is appropriate to end the present section, discussing whether stress can be beneficial, by the extreme view 
proposed by N. Taleb (2012) summarized under the vocable “antifragility”. According to this concept, 
“antifragile” systems may not only resist and recover efficiently from stressful events but may actually benefit 
from them in very direct ways and on the short term. Taleb lists a number of examples illustrating this view: 
muscles and bones, owning insurance or financial derivatives, decentralized organization and so on. If 
correct, the antifragile concept would contradict our whole construction presented above. To understand the 
source of  disagreement, we now dissect Taleb’ s proposition. In a nutshell, antifragility describes the quality 
of some systems that are designed to profit from particular stressors that produce stress in other systems 
and to which they are not sensitive themselves. But, as we are going to show, these so-called “antifragile” 
systems have also their own vulnerability to other stressors that lie outside their tailored design. 
 4.4.1 The put option paradigm
The example that captures the essence of the whole “antifragility” argument is that of financial derivatives. 
Consider specifically a put (also called “sell”) option written on some underlying financial asset. The later has 
values that fluctuates more or less randomly, with sometimes large excursions in the positive (gains) as well 
as negative (losses) ranges. An investor owning this asset will  be exposed to possible rare large losses, the 
so-called tail events. The investor’s investment is thus a priori  vulnerable to the occurrence of financial 
shocks that may hit his asset and make it fall abruptly. Fragility is particularly acute if, as such time, the 
investor needs to cash out for some consumption needs (unforeseen medical expenses or student university 
tuition for his children) at the much lower asset value following the crash. Another investor, who has bought a 
put option of that same asset, has a diametrically opposed perception of the situation: when the asset 
plunges, the value of his put option sky-rockets upwards. In the terminology of antifragility, the put option 
investment of the second investor is antifragile, since it profits from large negative price movements that hurt 
most other investors. The put option paradigm is actually underpinning the whole antifragility concept when 
applied to general situations, as developed in (Taleb and Douady, 2012). To summarize, Taleb advocates 
strategies and policies that construct effectively put options everywhere!
Let us clarify how a put option works. First, it needs a risky asset or a basket of risky assets that are 
subjected to the influence of many natural and social factors so that its value fluctuates with sometimes large 
amplitudes. Second, it needs a counter party, say a bank, which accepts to create the put option and sell it to 
the second investor. In the case when the put option is exercised, the counter party has to pay for the gain of 
the option owner. The put option strategy is thus conditional on others taking the other side of the risks. 
It is important to realize that the put option strategy is built on the premise that it can only work when 
endorsed by a minority of investors, at the expanses of the others. Take the example of the so-called 
“portfolio insurance” strategy developed in the 1980s by Leland and Rubinstein. Large institutional investors 
wanted to insure their large portfolios against possible drops of the stock market. For this, the simplest and 
most efficient strategy consists in buying put options on the assets held in the portfolios. However, the sheer 
volume of put options needed was beyond what banks and other option writers would be able or willing to 
offer. Or, if offered, the requested prices would have been prohibitive. Leland and Rubinstein then used the 
replicating construction of the Black and Scholes option pricing formula to devise a simple and effective way 
of constructing synthetic  put options just based on the underlying assets and on bonds. The synthetic  put 
options thus created led to a flourishing business where, at the time just before the crash of October 1987, 
more than one third of all US institutional investors had implemented the Leland-Rubinstein so-called 
insurance portfolio strategy (MacKenzie, 2008). The weakness of this whole construction however was 
revealed as markets started to stumble the week before “black monday” 19 October 1987. Because the 
synthetic put options operate by selling the underlying stocks when the later decreases in value, as the stock 
values start to go down, the synthetic  put option strategy led to sells, pushing prices further down, these 
losses aggravating the negative sentiments of the markets, leading to an avalanche of sells reinforced by the 
technical implementation of the synthetic  put options leading to a vicious positive feedback to the bottom. 
After the crash of October 1987, many pundits and scholars have concluded that, with a large probability, 
synthetic put option strategies were responsible for aggravating strongly the severity of the crash (Barro et 
al., 1989). What was supposed to be a bullet-proof strategy turned out as a catastrophe due to its hidden 
vulnerability with respect to synchronization. In other words, buying put options works when you are in the 
minority and no collective herding behavior occurs. More generally, the whole business of insurance is based 
on diversification of exposures. This message was vividly brought home to major insurance and re-insurance 
companies in the aftermath of the 911, when the capital  stored in stock markets needed to be sold to 
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compensate clients for their losses plummeted at the same time. This illustrated another mechanism of 
fragility of the supposed antifragile insurance strategy.
The 15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and 16 September 2008 AIG official  bail out 
demonstrate another fundamental  fragility of the antifragile put option strategy. In short, major investment 
banks around the world had invested in CDO (collateralized debt obligations), which are securitizations of 
mortgages offered to millions of american households. Many of these investment institutions search for ways 
to insure their exposition to possible losses on the CDOs by buying massive amounts of CDS (credit default 
swaps) from counterparts, the most famous and by far largest being AIG, the then largest insurance 
company in the World. Different from what their name suggests, CDS work essentially as put options paying 
large amounts when the underlying CDO loses value and/or when some trenches of the CDOs start to 
default. Buying CDS was a perfect antifragile strategy to profit from the rather visible problems looming as a 
result of the enormous real-estate bubble that has developed in the US from the early 2000s to 2007. Except 
for one thing: the credit risk of AIG was not considered. Default of AIG was inconceivable. The problem is 
that the collective use of the antifragile CDS strategy led to such an enormous exposition of AIG to a 
downturn of the US real  estate market that its total capital base became insufficient, finally leading to its 
quasi-bankruptcy and its final salvation by a massive injection of capital from the US treasury and a 
consortium of investment banks. The so-called antifragile CDS strategy backfired to systemic  proportions, 
whose real consequences are still to be solved as the time of writing. 
Moreover, for an inner circle of investment banks, the CDS strategy turned out to be really profitable, though 
not from the intrinsic structure of the strategy but from playing the fear to the public  of a global  financial  and 
economic  meltdown as well  as from using high-level political connections. The bail out packages, which were 
put in place in September 2008 and following months, ensured the payments of most of the liabilities at 
100% face value (which AIG could not longer support) to the major investment banks. The weight of these 
payments was in the end supported by the taxpayers. 
In sum, these dramatic  examples illustrate that antifragility does not exist. In general, for systems subjected 
to variability, noise, shocks and other random perturbations, it is possible to develop strategies that, on 
average, benefit from variability, but not any variability. Such strategies are designed to profit from the 
variability of particular stressors. Simultaneously, they are vulnerable to other stressors. The refusal to 
accept this fundamental  characteristic  (or intrinsic  weakness) shared by any strategy or system is very 
dangerous, as it may lead to unexpected shocks or intended manipulations by insiders. For instance, in the 
financial sphere, antifragility is a name for the exploitation of a situation that turns losses for most into gains 
for some by special design, which is however vulnerable to non-anticipated occurrences. Moreover, the so-
called antifragile strategy can contain the germs for large externalities, leading to systemic  crises for which 
neither the strategy itself nor the system are prepared for. 
 4.4.2 Can antifragility be beneficial itself?
Taleb has provided many tentative examples of supposedly antifragile systems, putting them in contrast with 
fragile and robust systems. For each instance (i-vii) below, the antifragile system (according to Taleb) is 
indicated in boldface and contrasted with its opposite fragile version:
(i) civilization (nomadic and hunter-gatherer tribes versus post-agriculture modern urbanization);
(ii) production (artisans versus industry), 
(iii) science/technology research (stochastic tinkering versus directed research); 
(iv) nature of the political systems (decentralized political systems versus centralized nation-states);
(v)  decision making (convex heuristics versus model-based probabilistic approach); 
(vi) literature (oral tradition versus books and e-readers);
(vii) reputation (artists or writers versus academics, executives and politicians) and so on.
In all  these examples, one notices that the antifragile system is much less productive that its fragile 
counterpart. In example (i), the capacity to support larger and growing populations has received an 
enormous boost with the introduction of agriculture while hunter-gatherer tribes had zero or very small 
growth. A typical north american family now commands a quantity of artifacts on par with or larger than that 
of a pharaoh at the peak of the classical pharaonic civilization. This illustrates that, in example (ii), the 
elaborate supply chains of modern industry based on the collaboration between millions of workers delivers 
enormously more than the whole summed contribution of individualistic generalists. In example (iii), the 
classical  Greek tradition let place after many centuries of “stochastic tinkering” to an organized scientific 
production in the last few decades that dwarfs absolutely the knowledge accumulated earlier. In example (iv), 
nation-states have been able to mobilize resources unheard of decentralized political  systems. Clausewitz 
(1984) [1832] in his classic  book “On war” observed that the french revolution introduced the nation state, 
which led to global wars with enormously more resources, an hypothesis recently supported quantitatively 
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using statistical comparative history (Cerderman et al., 2011). In example (v), heuristics may often work for 
simple everyday problems and when immediate quick-and-dirty solutions are required, but would be 
unreasonable for decision making and management in sophistical modern systems dealt with by surgeons, 
airline pilots or technicians of nuclear plants. In the case of literature (vi), it is clear that oral  tradition would 
not fail if electricity is no more available but, on the other hand, it is a very inefficient and low-density 
information medium, quite unsuitable to share and store the explosive amount of modern knowledge. Lastly 
(vii), academics, executives or politicians have developed extraordinary specialized skills that are (in 
principle) translated into positive reputation. A positive reputation serves the goal  of producing more or 
delivering higher quality services and/or of being trusted. In contrast, some artists and writers just need any 
type of reputation as long as people and media speak about them, because their business is in a sense to 
bank on their fame.
Pushing Taleb’s reasoning to the extreme, one could conclude that being a beggar is one of the most 
desirable antifragile state to be in, since the person has nothing to lose and can only benefit (if he survives) 
from any change of his position. The condition “if he survives” actually demonstrates the essential hidden 
assumption underlying antifragile examples. Otherwise, as soon as there is something to loose, to disproof 
or the possibility of a disfunction, as when owning assets, possessing a reputation, using a decision model, 
or production scheme, there are many additional  stressors that could cripple the system. Being rich, young, 
healthy, beautiful and loved is the ultimate fragile state, but who would exchange it for its absolute antifragile 
poor, aging, ill, ugly and lonely alter ego.
4.5 Can stress be beneficial? Our answer
To summarize, we have shown that stress is unavoidable and that systems co-evolve with their stressors. 
The survival of a system depends on its ability to cope with and adapt to numerous stressors. In this sense, 
the life-span of the adapting system is relatively longer than those of many of its stressors. These stressors, 
coming one after another, are progressively shaping the system, demonstrating sometimes a true symbiosis 
and an astonishing emergence of new features that can be beneficial  for the system itself. In evolutionary 
biology, non-visible or “neutral” mutations occurring in the presence of internal stresses as well  as small 
external stochastic  perturbations, and which leave fitness unchanged, are considered beneficial because 
they improve the system’s robustness (Kimura, 1983; Ciliberti et al., 2007). They provide a diversification by 
enlarging the toolbox of defense without disruption and prepare for major jumps when necessary or when 
ready (Wagner, 2005; Ciliberti et al., 2007). This concept seems to have broader applications, as recently 
proposed to quantify software robustness (Schulte et al., 2012). Finally, extreme stressors are relatively rare 
events, but they play an exceptional role in creating the global  landscape and activating the mechanism of 
natural selection. Their magnificent power gave rise to legendary names - “dragon-kings” (Sornette, 2009; 
Sornette and Ouillon, 2012), for the extreme stressors of endogenous nature, and black swans (Taleb, 2007) 
that are characterized by exogenous sources.
The response of a system to stressors depends on the level of stress within it. To make the system more 
efficient and flexible, it is important to learn how to use normal stress as a signal  of on-going changes and as 
a guide for needed adaptation to better fit to the evolving conditions, so that a system can survive and 
benefit from them. In the presence of extreme stress, resilience, that is, conservation of the status quo, may 
not be anymore an option and the resources should be directed towards an unavoidable transition to a new 
regime that can bear or even profit from the stress: in the words of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lamedusa, in The 
Leopard: "If we want everything to stay as it is, everything will have to change.”
In Section 5, we propose strategic principles for system resilience and describe some of them in details. 
However, the adoption of strategic principles in most cases would require global  systemic  changes and 
would face numerous difficulties, partially described at the end of section 3.3. Therefore, in Section 6, we 
discuss some of these limitations and propose original operational solutions.
5-RECIPES FOR RESILIENCE
5.1 Generic recipes for resilience
The systems that were previously mentioned are very different, and so are the conditions of their functioning 
and the stressors they face. Nevertheless, from the fact that stress is a non-specific response of a system 
that depend weakly on the type of stressor, it derives that the development of generic recipes to cope with 
stressors is both possible and crucial for strengthening its resilience.
We propose the following brief synthesis of strategic principles for the sustainable development of any 
system, which borrows from a variety of risk management thinkers, from Sun Tzu’s “The art of war” (circa 
500 BCE), Clausewitz’ “On war” (1984) [1832], John Boyd’s “certain to win” strategy and his OODA (observe-
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orient-decide-act) loop (Boyd, 1986; Richards, 2004) and Sheffi (2005). While rooted in ancient wisdom, their 
modern framing and phrasing do not diminish their reach and eternal relevance.
1) Develop strategic  vision; orientation and focus on the present and future, and not on the past; establish 
clear goals (subsection 5.2),
2) build up, through investment and/or education, fundamental values, right incentives and fair 
remuneration (subsection 5.3),
3) diversify and promote heterogeneity, as well as decoupling of key components for sufficient redundancy,
4) develop operational mechanisms to enforce contracts,
5) promote transparency, communication and ethics.
At the operational level, tools for quantification of stress signals and learning from them should be put in 
practice in order to cope with stress effectively, i.e. to improve (i) the quality of decisions in the presence of 
risks and (ii) the management of resilience. These tools are to serve the following goals:
a) development of individual strengths together with awareness of one’s limits,
b) promotion of collective action and collaborations,
c) analysis and classification of stressors,
d) risk identification and tracking,
e) continuous measurements and diagnosis of endogenous instabilities,
f) never ending verification and validation,
g) always keeping on edge by questioning assumptions and existing processes.
This last point is easy to formulate on paper but much harder to implement in practice, if only because of the 
common adage that “No one see any pressing need to ask hard questions about the source of profits, of 
success, or stability, when things are doing well.” Building resilience requires indeed a kind of paranoic 
obsession that things could go wrong, when everything appears to be fine. Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4 provide 
concrete examples of such operational tools.
5.2 Formulation of goals and objectives
The first step on the way towards implementing the strategic  principles for the sustainable development of a 
system is to identify and spell  out the goals and objectives, which can also be called utility functions of the 
system. In this subsection, the strategies and methods of resilience growth are outlined into accordance with 
different types of goals. 
(1) At the most basic level, a first goal is to ensure survival, which calls for the measures promoting viability 
that are described in section 3.2, in particular using stress as information and being always ready for 
managerial actions to ensure that the system remains in its basin of attraction.
(2) A second type of goals is often the conservation of the status quo, of existing wealth, of present standard 
of living. This triggers what we referred to as the “fight” response, which applies when the stress is 
significantly smaller than the existing resilience of the system. However, many systems, human societies 
and organizations in particular, reach high levels of wealth, which were obtained at the cost of strong 
optimization, decrease of reserves, indebtedness, increase of inter-dependencies (Diamond, 2004), 
which result in loss of resilience. In these situations, the fight response to maintain homeostasis at such 
high development levels is simply not possible in the middle and long term, because even small stressors 
will  in the end be enough to trigger a change of regime due to the endogenous build-up of a critical 
fragility. As a vivid and painful  example, one can argue that the present on-going sovereign debt 
European crisis belongs to this class. Only with a profound reassessment of goals taking into account the 
realities of the globalized economy and the structural unbalances underlying the artificial construction of 
the euro dream, can one hope to address the systemic nature of the European conundrum.
(3) A third type of goals, often observed in high-tech industries for instance, is for an entity to become and 
stay the leader among its pairs, hence developing highly competitive attitudes and strategies. IBM, 
Toyota and Apple are different examples of firms that were able to get to the top and remain there for 
longer than thought initially possible. For IBM, this was through its evolution from a mainframe computer 
hardware company to a service provider offering all possible integrated solutions to a large range of 
customers, thus redefining continuously what is the essence of being IBM. For Toyota, the empowerment 
of the factory workers, instructed to focus on the delivery of just-in-time products, led to a remarkably 
motivated and productive workforce delivering high quality products for more than 50 years. But the 2010 
car recalls due to the sticking accelerator pedals and failing electronic  throttle controls demonstrated that 
bureaucracy, overconfidence and weak management have lately underpinned Toyota’s fall from grace. 
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Apple’s remarkable success can be attributed to its focus on innovation aimed at surprising and 
enthusing customers, by functioning as a secret organization with a self-perpetuating start-up culture. For 
these companies, resilience at the top requires internal engineering of their ever on-going mutation, 
aiming at shaping the future rather than reacting to it, in the spirit of “You don’t wait for the future. You 
create it.” (Hwang Chang Gyu, 2004).
(4) In the modern world, the economic language and agenda dominates, with such concepts as utility 
function (assumed to capture people’s goals) and growth of GDP (gross domestic product) taken as the 
universal  measure of improvement and success. But, too little attention is given on what the US founders 
enshrined in the US constitution as one of the three main goals of well-functioning societies, namely the 
pursuit of happiness. In the United States and in many other industrialized countries, happiness is often 
equated with money. This simplifying assumption provides a convenient way of quantifying and 
comparing heterogeneous preferences of different agents within a unifying framework. This money (or 
economic  utility function) approach has shaped our culture. Only the small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan 
has made its priority to grow, not its GDP, but its GNH (gross national happiness). According to King 
Jigme Singye Wangchuck, Bhutan’s goals are to ensure that prosperity is shared across society and that 
it is balanced against preserving cultural traditions, protecting the environment and maintaining a 
responsive government. In our context, this can also be interpreted as promoting a resilient society, 
based on (i) robustness anchored at the individual level (a happy and balanced person is arguably more 
robust in her behavioral  response to stressors) and (ii) through cohesion within the society build on a 
common understanding that ethical behavior is fairly rewarded and equity (and not “equality” as in 
communism) is the standard reference.
The development of a strategy requires an out-of-the-box thinking and the consideration of multi-dimensional 
objectives. Setting up goals depend also often crucially on the time scales of interest as well  as on the size 
scales (individual versus group versus society). There are well-known differences in goals and welfare 
attained at the individual versus collective levels. It is often difficult to reconcile the preference of individuals 
with those of the aggregate group. This is known as Arrow’s impossibility theorem in social  choice theory 
(Campbell and Kelly, 2002). At the extreme, the sacrifice of individuals may ensure the survival of the whole 
system. Lymphocytes are not resilient individually but ensure the resilience of the immune system. Such 
strategies are apparently at the opposite end of Bhutan’s emphasis on individual happiness. This suggests 
that there may be several  paths towards system resilience and/or that the level and type of resilience is also 
a matter of choice, given the conflicting requirements (costs versus benefits at different levels).
5.3 Fundamental values and individual strength as a basis of resilient societies
Resilience of a system depends first on the sustainability of its development and its fitness to environmental 
conditions through processes of adaptation and co-evolution (as described in section 4.1 and 4.2). These 
characteristics ensure reduced amount of stress accumulating within the system. Second, the resilience of 
the system is based on its strength to cope with the existing stress and its causal factors. To grow and 
maintain both of these characteristics over the long term, it is essential to build up fundamental  values 
through education and investment, and to implement the right incentives and fair renumeration.
At the system level, it can be illustrated by the following examples:
• fundamental  prices of assets are more stable and predictable than their bubble components, which are 
unstable and may lead to severe crashes;
• practical skills (farming, engineering, programming, the development of the real economy, and so on) 
should be better rewarded both economically and in our cultures; stakeholders should pay attention to 
the added-value of supporting services (financing, marketing, management, and so on) and not 
hesitate to shrinking and redirecting efforts when these supporting services become tyrants rather than 
servants of the real economy;
• hard work, persistence, tenacity and dedication should be emphasized (which is at the opposite of the 
common modern emphasis on the role of chance and luck, the belief in easy profits, the "american 
dream" now fueled by a perpetual expanding credit engine).
The implementation of the recipes for resilience designed at the system level may not all  apply directly to the 
individual, due to differences in the goals as well as psychological and physical aspects. The rest of this 
subsection is focused on recipes for personal  resilience and top performance, which are easy to implement 
by everyone. To change the world, one should start with oneself. 
Section 3.3 documented that many natural systems evolved to function “at the edge of chaos”, characterized 
by a sharp balance between level  of risks they face and costly resilience build-up. Management of social-
economic  systems is also striving to achieve a balance between costs of increased resilience and its 
benefits. But would “at the edge of chaos” be a desirable state for a human? To stay a long time close to 
criticality, in a kind of alarmed position, requires constant attention, give rise to worries and triggers anxiety. 
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In the end, there is the possibility that such a critical  state does not lead to an efficient allocation of resources 
of the body and mind, but becomes stress itself. 
One should consider an additional dimension, an often neglected benefit that comes from higher resilience: 
resilient people are more “happy” and vice-versa. Indeed, people who feel on top of their life and who can 
face stress are more relaxed, enjoy more the present and live longer. More resilience promotes a more 
positive attitude to one’s own life and to others. In contrast, those of us who are in a continuous race to face 
the constraints of personal  and professional  life live in a state of anxiety, a condition that has been 
accelerating in severity in recent decades as witnessed by the exploding sales of antidepressants. Research 
in psychology and psychiatry confirms the existence of a strong interdependence between resilience and 
happiness, with positive feedback loops in which higher positive mind set promotes resilience and vice-versa 
(Jackson and Watkin, 2004; Srivastava and Sinha, 2005; Cohn et al., 2009). In particular, positive emotions 
help people build lasting resources (Cohn et al., 2009). And it is how we respond to stress and hard time that 
determine our successes or failures, rather than the nature of the stresses themselves.  This supports again 
the need for generic and robust recipes for building up resilience and... happiness at the individual level. 
In a review covering a large body of research investigations on individual  resilience, Coutu (2002) extracted 
the three main characteristics that are most often associated with resilient people: 
(i) a staunch acceptance of reality, 
(ii) a deep belief that life is meaningful, and 
(iii) an uncanny ability to improvise.
Our own experience and reflection suggest to add 
(iv) the ability to keep an inquiring mind that questions assumptions and the status quo and 
(v) a strong belief that our project and endeavors will succeed.
The seven factors of resilience reviewed by Jackson and Watkin (2004) from the psychological point of view 
overlap with the two first items, that is, with the need of developing a realistic view of reality and finding 
meanings (or causality). Indeed, they cite the following seven factors: (a) emotion regulation, (b) impulse 
control, (c) causal analysis, (d) self-efficacy, (e) realistic optimism, (f) empathy and (g) reaching out. 
These are descriptors or traits of resilient individuals. In order to be genuinely useful  however, the next step 
is to identify whether and how it is possible to acquire, nurture and augment these traits. We are here 
entering the controversial domains of psychological  programs and even psychiatric treatments. We take a 
simple “mechanistic” approach based on the premise that the above traits do not reside in a vacuum but 
rather are properties of bodies and minds that can be trained. Take the example of will power.  In a study of 
one million people quoted by Baumeister and Tierney (2012), most said that self-control was their biggest 
weakness. So can people build up their willpower? Or are some people just born that way? In their recent 
book, Baumeister (who directs the social psychology program at Florida State University) and Tierney (2012) 
argue that willpower is like a muscle, and like all  muscles, can be exhausted through overuse, but also 
trained to be made stronger. We could say that a strong willpower gives benefits by a slow accumulation of 
small gains that grow over time. The build-up of willpower operated via a positive feedback process: the 
more you have, the more you use “rituals” and checklist type approaches, the better the performance, the 
stronger is gratification for the efforts spent, the larger the willpower, the more ....  in a virtuous loop of self-
reinforcement. Baumeister and Tierney also emphasize that everything is linked together and that one 
energy resource is used for all kinds of acts for self-control. One could then argue that, by training and 
augmenting the energy source, the stronger and more energetic the body and the mind, the easier it is to 
develop the factors promoting resilience. In this strategy, resilience has its underpinning in the strength as 
well as cohesion between constitutive elements found at the level of metabolism. 
In a recent contribution, one of us (Sornette, 2011) has laid out seven governing principles for personal 
resilience and performance that we repeat for completeness. We refer to the original essay and its detailed 
documentation and argumentation. The seven guiding recipes for individual resilience and performance are 
anchored in processes that control  our biological and psychological  well-being. Implementing these 
principles require willpower, which can be augmented both by the fact of being used, as in the muscle 
analogy of Baumeister and Tierney (2012), and by promoting the access to more energy as the source for 
action.
1) Sleep: Rest with quality sleep for a minimum of 7-8 hours per night;
2) Love and sex: Cultivate the romance and relationship with your special  partner; interrupt your work 
when needed with one minute of intense focus on the loved one, perhaps using romantic pictures of 
him/her to trigger happiness hormones that boosts brain performance and well-being.
3) Deep breathing and daily exercises: Start each of your day (no exception) with 5-10 minutes of 
exercises, including deep breathing-stretching followed by abdominal and finishing with a very short 
intense workout; perform a few 2-3 minutes of intense workouts and deep breathing at different 
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times of your day in your office or wherever you happen to be in order to oxygen your body and 
refresh your brain;
4) Water and chewing: Drink at least 2 liters of water per day (no canned juice, no coke, no beer, no 
sugar) outside meals and drink minimally or not at all during meals (a small glass of red wine or cup 
of hot green tea is fine); “drink your food” and “eat your drinks”.
5) Fruits, unrefined products, food combination, vitamin D and sun exposure and no meat and 
no dairy: Eat as much fruits with water as possible on an empty stomach during the day, avoid meat 
and consume only unrefined products and cereals; avoid bad food combination to avoid conflicts 
between alkaline versus acid foods.
6) Power foods: onion, garlic, lemon, kiwis, almonds, nuts, dry fruits for super-performance in time of 
intense demand.
7) Play, intrinsic motivation, positive psychology and will: rediscover the homo ludens in yourself 
in things small and large so that work and life become a large playground, cultivate motivation as a 
self-reinforcing positive feedback virtuous circle.
6-HUMAN LIMITS AND OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
6.1 Intrinsic human limits
 6.1.1  Identification of stress signals and reactions to them
The analysis of the major industrial  catastrophes, such as the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster, the 
explosion of the Ariane V rocket on its maiden flight in 1996, the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill  disaster that 
started on 20th April 2010, the Fukushima-Daichii nuclear accident in March 2011 and so on, reveals 
common problems in the following areas: 
 1) gathering information; 
 2) aggregating and communicating data;
 3) maintaining a state of attention.
These same issues, which have been documented as underlying causes of these dramatic events, are 
similarly found underlying most accidents and crises in different fields of human activity, including the 
financial crises that started to rock the world in 2007-2008.
Gathering evidence about informative incidents is a well-known challenging task in the practice of 
operational risk management. Employees often experience a conflict of interests with respect to reporting 
problems concerning the area of their own responsibility or those of their colleagues. This may rise, for 
example, from the fear of punishment, disapproval of colleagues and seniors,  and increase of duties to 
correct revealed weaknesses. As a result, signals of stress are often lost, near misses are not recorded, 
forgotten or dismissed, and decisions are made on the basis of unrealistically optimistic data. Furthermore, 
from the failure of reporting and aggregating information that is in fact known within the organization, 
vulnerabilities are accumulated and lead to greater accidents.
The other side of the “information problem” lies in the difficulty of maintaining a constant state of attention or 
excitation. It is not enough to detect a signal  of growing stress, but there should be measures taken to 
address the issue. Unfortunately, people get used to warning signals and false alarms, and lower their guard. 
Again, this applies to all the above mentioned industrial catastrophes and to many more.
The first step in dealing with these problems is for the top-management to accept the unavoidable nature of 
stress so that appropriate stimulating mechanisms can be developed:
 1) for gathering and communicating information:
• no punishment for self-reported occasional misses, as well as in the cases when all  sufficient 
measures were taken to ensure a desired result (i.e. evaluating the process of decision-
making, but not only an ex-post outcome);
• confidentiality;
 2) for maintaining a high attention:
• “zero tolerance” to controllable misses;
• the introduction of random stressors (such as sending “fake hard customers” to check the 
professionalism of employees);
• a rewarding system for catching a stress signal.
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 6.1.2 The “logic of failure”
In their study on the “logic of failures” (Dörner et al., 1990; Dörner, 1997), Dörner and collaborators have 
found that there is indeed a logic in the origins and processes leading to failures, in the sense that (a) 
humans experience failure more often than success when intervening in complex systems, (b) the failures 
are not random, but exhibit common patterns and (c) the understanding of these patterns offer operational 
rules to prevent the failures. The studies performed by Dörner et al. led them to formulate general 
recommendations taking the exact counterpoints of the negative behaviors and habits that tend to inhabit 
people. Unsurprisingly, these recommendations overlap and sometimes complement the generic  recipes 
outlined in section 5.1. In order to avoid failure and develop successful  management of complex systems, 
one should
(a) continue to reflect and ask questions during the evolution of the project or system, 
(b) act after careful analysis and be multi-faceted to ensure a rich toolbox of responses, 
(c) strive to anticipate effects of one’s actions, 
(d) estimate possible negative feedbacks and unintended consequences, 
(e) not shy away from adapting policies that are not working, and 
(f) carefully assess the real goals as opposed to be over-involvement in pet projects.
 6.1.3 The “illusion of control” syndrome  
Last but not least, one should always have in mind the “illusion of control” syndrome (Langer, 1975; 
Satinover and Sornette, 2007; 2011), as already mentioned in the introduction. As a corollary, individuals 
appear hard-wired to over-attribute success to skill, and to underestimate the role of chance, when both are 
in fact present. Grandin and Johnson (2005) recount experiments pitting humans against rats, in which the 
humans, like the rats, have not been explained the rules of the game but must infer them from the situation. 
In such experiments, rats often beat humans, because humans tend to over-interpret randomness and find 
meaning in random patterns. Normal people have an “interpreter” in their left brain that takes all  the random, 
contradictory details of whatever they are doing or remembering at the moment, and smoothes everything in 
one coherent story. If there are details that do not fit, they are edited out or revised for sense making, 
providing a powerful mechanism for the illusion of meaning and of control. These phenomena are ubiquitous. 
Langer (1975) summarized the problem in a rather amusing way: “normal people’s high level  of general 
intelligence makes them too smart for their own good.” 
This problem is perhaps best illustrated in finance where, after a full cycle of rise and fall  after which stocks 
are valued just where they were at the start before the fall, most investors lose money by over-reacting and 
thus selling close to the bottom before the rebound (Guyon, 1965). More recently, a very large body of 
academic  works support the conclusion that most managers underperform the “buy-and-hold” strategy and 
that the persistence of winners is very rare (Malkiel, 2012). Nevertheless, managed funds and the demand 
for professional investment advice has never been stronger and is a multi-trillion dollar industry, dominating 
the world of pension funds, mutual funds, sovereign funds, private banking and so on. [Disclaimer: we are 
not advocating buy-and-hold or inactive strategies, because we believe that the second decade of the 21st 
century is characterized by disequilibria and instabilities that make extrapolation of the past at best uncertain 
and mostly misleading.] The “illusion of control” syndrome is thus a call for realizing and understanding our 
cognitive biases (just look at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases for an impressive list 
compiled on wikipedia). The psychological as well  as philosophical literatures have discussed many times 
the intrinsic  limits faced by any investigator trying to determine whether and how her own cognitive 
processes may deform her knowledge construction of the “outside” world. This is typified at the extreme by 
the madman who concludes, from the deformed lenses of his perceptions, that it is the rest of the world who 
is mad. In the context of dynamical game theory, Satinover and Sornette (2007; 2011) have determined 
precisely the conditions under which the “illusion of control” syndrome occurs. In dynamical  first-entry games 
(a subset of game theory), they found that low entropy (more informative) strategies under-perform high 
entropy (random) strategies. This typically occurs in situations where there is a large amount of randomness, 
of uncertainty as well as the presence of negative feedbacks of the decision makers’ actions onto the 
system. 
6.2 “Crisis flight simulator” for management of complex systems and resilience build-up	  
The “illusion of control” and the “logic of failure” raise the following fundamental questions for practice. What 
is the value of management? How much management and control is needed? How can we falsify the value 
of control  and of management, given that we do not have the luxury of playing history twice or multiple 
times? How is it possible to improve management skills when dealing with complex systems? Many studies 
and thinkers have pondered these issues. The recommendations given in the literature argue for a balance 
between extremes, such as strong top-down leadership to convey the goals and the vision, together with 
large responsibility and autonomy given to the bottom execution; a cohesive and strong backbone linking the 
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individuals in an efficient hierarchical network of complementary abilities and trust together with a flexible 
adaptive organization to face changing and uncertain conditions. But how to achieve the right balance?
We propose that the answer lies in fostering a permeating and ubiquitous learning and testing environment, 
as occurs during academic  curricula, and which should grow within all  resilient organizations. This can take 
the shape of the systematic development of “crisis flight simulators” everywhere. 
Consider the subprime crisis that started in 2007 with epicenter in the U.S. and the on-going sovereign crisis 
in Europe. To stop these systemic crises, central  banks and governments have resorted to extraordinary 
measures, such as growing the balance of central banks with amounts of so-called toxic assets at levels 
dwarfing all known historical precedents. It is fair to state that we now live in a world where central banks and 
government are performing experiments in real  time that are impacting billions of people, based on dated 
economic  models (such as the Dynamical  Stochastic General Equilibrium), which until recently did not even 
incorporate a banking sector and could not consider the possibility of systemic financial  failures due to 
contagion. Not much has changed, though. The “primitive” approach of policy and decision making, based 
on rule-of-thumbs, political  agenda, demagogy, and untested models, is still in full  force. In contrast, we 
argue that progress requires to endow decision makers with tools to learn and to practice at the level that 
airline pilots or surgeons already experience in their training. These “flight” or “surgery” simulators reproduce 
as faithfully as possible real processes as well  as all imaginable and even unimaginable scenarios to perform 
“what if” exercises. This approach is relevant for all  kind of decision markers, including those in the financial, 
policy, engineering and environmental domains, and concerns also the public, students and anyone 
interested and responsible.
A good example of an early development of “crisis flight simulators” is the approach of Dörner et al. (1990) 
and Dörner (1997) mentioned above. Dörner and his colleagues conducted experiments with computer 
simulated environments, which included two groups of participants - executives and students. Analyzing the 
results of the experiments and the significant better performance of the executives, the authors proposed the 
concept of “strategic flexibility”, which is essential in coping with uncertainty and can be learnt through 
practical experience or by successive computer simulations.
The goal should thus consist in developing sophisticated convivial simulation platforms that incorporate 
detailed physical, geological, meteorological, geological, architectural, sociological, cultural, psychological 
and economic data with all known (and to be tested) feedback loops. For a given simulation, decision 
makers are given the power to make decisions on allocated resources to develop projects and to mitigate 
risks according to different strategies. The simulations will then demonstrate the consequences of the 
decisions within a multi-period set-up. Only by “living” through scenarios and experiencing them, can 
decision makers make progress. For instance, there is enormous evidence in the laboratory and in real life 
settings that veterans who have lived through financial  bubbles and crashes, through environmental  crises 
and so on, are much better at prevention and mitigation. But, in practice, the cost is too large to learn from 
real life crises. This calls for a methodology for resilience based on the development of simulators that 
decision makers use to understand the complex dynamics of out-of-equilibrium systems whose behavior 
intrinsically includes changes of regimes, bifurcations, tipping points and their associated crises. This 
ambition is for instance shared by the FuturICT project, as embodied in its “Living Earth Simulator”, which 
aims at enabling the exploration of future scenarios by large-scale simulations and hybrid modeling 
approaches running on supercomputers [Bishop et al., 2011; Helbing and Balietti, 2011; Helbing et al., 2011]. 
 
With such tools, the decision maker is able to understand holistically the dynamics of the system, in a 
systemic way, which means that he can understand the existence of systemic  instabilities as one of the 
dynamical  solutions of the system evolution. This must be complemented by a classification of the different 
regimes possible, a phase diagram in which the decision maker understands which control leads to the 
region of the unwanted regimes and which do not. He needs to understand that bifurcations and changes of 
regime are a natural  and expected part of natural and social systems. This understanding does not occur via 
studying arcane mathematical theory but, instead, by experimenting as in real  life, albeit with the protective 
comfort of the simulator and the efficiency of scaling space and time as needed. Only under this systemic 
structural understanding, can he interpret correctly the precursory signs in real life and use them to correct 
and steer the system towards resilience and sustainability.
In order to achieve effective “crisis flight simulator” platform for management and resilience, three technical 
goals must be achieved: (i) modeling, (ii) collective action and (iii) crowd sourcing. 
 First, there is the need to transform complex risks scenarios from natural language into a logical, 
machine-interpretable description. For that, it is necessary to reach a sufficient level of abstraction to 
address a broad variety of scenarios and make them reusable. We envision that complex risk scenarios 
could be seen as electronic  circuits with components acting as relays, delayers, amplifiers, dampers, 
transistors, and so on, connecting at-risk entities. For instance, consider three entities A, B and C. A 
transistor dependence would be: A fails implies that C fails if B is activated. By combining basic components, 
arbitrarily complicated scenarios can be built and, moreover, scenarios can be machine-tested. This first 
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approach intends to identify elementary components from which any arbitrarily complicated risk situation can 
be designed and tested in real risk situations. After preliminary calibration, volunteers can be invited to play, 
to reuse these elements, to build and to simulate their own risk scenarios.
 Second, there is the need to develop a sustainable mobilization of the crowds, so as to promote a 
“collective action” approach to large and systemic risks (T. Maillart, private discussions). While the first 
proposed approach to complex risks management might interest risk researchers and professionals, its 
democratized adoption by users of very different backgrounds, socio-economic horizons, age classes and 
cultures is critical  to gather and to organize scattered information, in order to address large scale scenarios. 
To ensure sustainable mobilization of large populations of users, focus on intrinsic motivation is key. It will be 
necessary to explore the factors of motivation (hedonic  pleasure and personal interests) and their relative 
proportion from their contribution behaviors. Two kinds of behaviors are expected: in their personal  sphere of 
interests, many individuals will  gather and submit the necessary information to document and verify 
scenarios, while others will rather focus on technical challenges for the pleasure of making a nice design that 
works. Progressive migration from the first to the second category becomes a proxy of internalization of 
knowledge and skills by users. Intrinsic  motivation ought to drive also individual efforts towards most relevant 
risk scenarios. As a consequence, having a large number of contributors is the assurance of more accurate 
design, of better testing and of increased validity. By having many people contribute similar scenarios (or 
pieces of scenarios), it will be possible to derive quantitative metrics out of qualitative contributions.
 Third, it is necessary to develop crowd sourcing to improve the perception of regime shifts and 
systemic crises. There is always a large part of subjectivity in the way people perceive risks, which are 
complex, uncertain or even ambiguous. Such biases are likely to emerge as more individuals with various 
backgrounds and interests will  join and contribute to the simulation platform, and therefore, must be 
considered. In fact, the possibility to capture human perception biases regarding risks at large scales should 
rather be considered as an opportunity to understand the revealed preferences that, by self-fulfilling 
prophecies or reflexivity, condition the choices of society. Crowd sourcing is expected to reveal  and address 
idiosyncratic perception biases and further extract systematic ones among large populations. Finally, with 
contributors coming from various cultural  background, differences in the perception of risks should be 
empirically measured at large scales.
The simulation tools of the “crisis flight simulator” for resilience build-up should be extraordinarily useful for 
(i) scientific synthesis of different fields in a coherent framework, 
(ii) the training of decision makers who do not realize the unintended consequences of their 
decisions (many of whom are negative and often with enormously bad consequences) and 
(iii) the education of the public, of citizens and of students to be informed as well  as to help them 
direct policy by voting in an informed way. 
Different institutions and companies have developed initiatives that have some relationship but are in general 
much more limited than the presently proposed vision of “crisis flight simulators”. One can mention the 
Japanese Earth Simulator (http://www.jamstec.go.jp/esc/index.en.html, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Earth_Simulator), the Sentient World White Paper (http://www.scribd.com/doc/25656152/Sentient-World-
Simulation), Google.org (http://www.google.org/) that utilizes “collective action”, Gapminder (http://
www.gapminder.org/) for monitoring and visualizing various indices and others.
6.3 Resilience by multi-variable measurement and prediction
 
 6.3.1 Multi-variable measurement of resilience
In Section 3, it was demonstrated that resilience can be seen as one of the indirect measures of stress used 
in social sciences. Considering a problem from a different angle, the resilience of a system, i.e., its ability to 
cope with stress, and its measurement can be improved by taking into account:
 1) the multidimensionality of resilience, as the development of a system can be motivated by several 
goals (subsection 5.2);
 2) complementary (preferably direct) dynamical measures of:
• stressors, to which the system is sensitive (e.g. risk measures are used in a probabilistic 
approach),
• stress, developing within the system (e.g. crash hazard rate),
• costs and efficiency of managerial actions.
As a system is subjected to the influence of numerous factors, which have different effects and are 
interconnected, it is important that the measurement of resilience would be based not on a single 
characteristic  but include an ensemble of them. It would be very useful to track the dynamics of different 
stressors and their influence on the stress reaction of the system, as well as monitor how managerial  actions 
affect both of them. Armed with this type of quantitative data, decision makers will be able to better 
understand the regime in which the system is functioning. They will  be able to identify the true source of 
change in the stress level of the system. The origin of change may include some beneficial dynamics of a 
stressor, managerial  actions, and/or the adaptation of the system to changing conditions. Decision makers 
may then be able to develop better policy, based on a risk-benefit analysis. 
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Despite existing limitations, especially in systems that include the “human factor” (see subsection 6.1), 
theoretical and empirical  findings suggest that such a complex quantitative approach to resilience is not only 
possible but, in many cases, can be enhanced by the development of a predicting capacity. 
The next subsection 6.3.2 proposes a more systematic  classification of the type of stressors. Then, 
subsection 6.3.3 builds on the endogenous nature of many crises to suggest the most ambitious approach 
yet discussed here, namely the “time@risk” approach based on the monitoring of precursors towards the 
prediction of financial and economic crises. This is nothing but the operational implementation of the famous 
maxim “Gouverner, c’est prevoir” (governing is predicting) by Emile de Girardin.
 6.3.2 Analysis of stressor types (exogenous versus endogenous and their interplay)
(1) Stressors can come from external  sources and the environment, beyond the direct control of the system. 
Some are knowable, quantifiable, in the possible losses and their frequencies. This is the favorable 
situations where counter measures can be build to prepare for the possible losses and to catalyze 
recovery, using the dynamical framework described in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Considering external 
stressors, responsible managers and decision makers should also consider the real surprises, such as in 
the Knightian uncertainty of unknown unknowns popularized by Taleb (2007)’s “black swans”. Then, 
resilience can only be attained with the interplay between, as already said, (i) individual strength and 
adaptation, (ii) cohesion of the social group as well  as (iii) a balance between clear top-down vision that 
does not exclude the empowerment of individuals at the “bottom” to be able to inform the top and act 
decisively when needed.
(2) Stressors are also often of an endogenous nature, even if exogenous influences and fluctuating 
perturbations are always present in out-of-equilibrium open “living” systems. By endogenous, we mean 
that there is a progressive evolution and maturation of internal interactions between constitutive elements 
that may give rise to surprising large-scale collective changes. Mathematically, the theory of bifurcations 
describes well  the sudden change of regime from one state or attractor to another one or to a set of other 
competing attractors upon the small variation of a so-called control parameter. In the bifurcation theory 
applied to dynamical systems, the fundamental  reduction theorem states that bifurcations between states 
can only occur through a limited number of ways that are known and classified (Thom, 1989; 
Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983; Manoel, and Stewart, 2000; Kuznetsov, 2004) and under the change 
of a small number of (most likely, one) control parameters. Of course, what is the control parameter 
relevant for a given transition is not known in general but the knowledge that this is the case empowers 
the decision maker to realize that a given crisis may have a “simple” set of mechanisms after all, whose 
understanding may be used to track the transition. More precisely, according to this view, it is possible to 
develop advanced diagnostics of an incoming crisis and invest in techniques to identify precursors. As a 
corollary, resilience involves precautionary actions that address the observed internal changes. More 
ambitiously, managers should consider the possibility to change the course and steer the system away 
from the trouble that is progressively announced by the precursors. In this vein, we claim that many, if not 
most catastrophes, occur as a surprise because stakeholders and managers have ignored. either by lack 
of knowledge, insufficient commitment or on purpose, the telling signs of the incoming crisis.
 6.3.3 Resilience by advanced diagnostics and precautionary actions in finance and 
economics: the “time@risk” approach
Imagine you had advanced warning signs (and that you listened to them) about the future occurrence of an 
adverse shock to your firm. Imagine that you could have access to precursory signs of diseases not yet 
symptomatic in your body (as is the dream of Proteomics). Imagine you could rely on an indicator diagnosing 
the existence of a financial  bubble and indicating the probable time of its burst (as we are developing at the 
ETH Zurich Observatory of Financial Crises: www.er.ethz.ch/fco/). Imagine that these advanced signs would 
be revealed years in advance. With this kind of information, you could prepare, you could reflect on what is 
not working and what could be improved or changed. You could start a process towards building stronger 
resilience, catalyzed by the knowledge of the nature and severity of the stressors forecasted to come. In 
contrast to ignorance or complacency, advanced diagnostics could revolutionize risk management by 
pushing us into action to build defenses. A working advanced diagnostic  system would not be static, but 
would provide continuous updates on possible scenarios and their probabilistic weights, so that a culture of 
preparedness and adaptation be promoted. This corresponds to exploiting the concept elaborated in section 
4 concerning the coevolution of systems and their stressors. Here, we go one step further by suggesting that 
forecasting the occurrence of crises promotes the evolution of the system towards a higher level of resilience 
that could not be achieved even by evolution (which is backward looking). Advanced diagnostics of crises 
constitutes the next level of evolution for cognizant creatures who use advanced scientific  tools to forecast 
their future.
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To be concrete, we describe how this system, which we refer to as the “time@risk” approach, would look like 
when targeting financial and economic instabilities. Here, the outstanding challenge is to develop predictions 
of systemic risk and global  financial  instabilities that have emerged as leading concerns in modern 
economies and with globalization. As Einstein said: “Problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking 
that created them.” Therefore, a truly interdisciplinary approach to the diagnostic  of such crises is required. 
By leveraging on expertise in Economics, Mathematics, Statistical  Physics and Computer Science, a novel 
integrated and network-oriented approach can be brought to bear on the issue. This would require providing
 1. a theoretical framework to measure systemic risk in global financial market and financial networks;
 2. an ICT collaborative platform for monitoring global systemic risk;
 3. algorithms and models to forecast and visualize interactively possible future scenarios.
Consider the example of a financial  crash, such as “black monday” 19 October 1987 mentioned in section 
4.4.1. A sum of evidences suggests that it did not come out the blue. Postmortem analysis of many financial 
crashes shows the development of a kind of standard scenario, as documented for instance by Kindleberger 
(2005) and Sornette (2003). A financial  crash is the result of increasing financial  leverage developing 
together with social  herding and the psychology of a “new economy”. Specifically, this creates bubbles, and 
the crashes are nothing but the termination and burst of the bubbles. Using the concept of stress developed 
throughout the present essay, this endogenous maturation of the financial  system towards an instability can 
be quantified by the excess super-exponential accelerating bubble price. This excess growing price can be 
used as a direct measure of the level  of stress increasing within the system. This can be shown via the 
theoretical linkage between the “crash hazard rate” and the excess price (Johansen et al., 1999; 2000; Yan 
et al., 2012). 
Other early warning stress signals and diagnostics for the upcoming transition into the major regime shifts 
associated with crises include, as reported by (Sornette, 2002; 2004; Dakos et al., 2008; Scheffer, 2009),
(i) a slowing down of the recovery from perturbations, 
(ii) increasing or decreasing autocorrelations, 
(iii) increasing variance of endogenous fluctuations, 
(iv) appearance of flickering and stochastic  resonance, and other noise  amplification effects (Harras 
et al., 2012), 
 (v) increasing spatial  coherence, and singular behavior of metrics revealing positive feedbacks 
(Sammis and Sornette, 2002; Johansen and Sornette, 2010).
This is a very general problem and, in principle, the “time@risk” approach can be extended to various 
domains of application. The corresponding “time@risk” platform should ideally 
(a) signal the possible occurrence of a crisis; 
(b) provide insights to adopt the appropriate policy measures; and 
(c) allow evaluating future scenarios according to the chosen policy. 
The development of a framework for a computational  forecasting infrastructure must necessarily combine 
modeling the relevant entangled networks with empirical analysis and validation of the models. Finally, there 
is a need to craft the tools into an interactive platform. Therefore, the objectives of the “time@risk” approach 
can be stated as follows.s
 1: Provide novel indicators and methods to estimate the origin and dynamics of systemic risk and 
forecast probability of systemic crises.
 2: Develop agent-based models of the interacting networks which (a) are suitable to be validated, 
and (b) allow to compute indicators of systemic risk.
 3: Validate the models with empirical data.
 4: Develop a measurement platform in which it is possible to 
(a) load and share relevant data about the involved institutions and their relations, 
(b) produce topical maps of interacting networks, 
(c) detect the propagation of distress, and 
(d) perform simulations, scenario analysis, and systemic risk estimation.
This is an ambitious and risky approach. One should be aware of the risks and difficulties in the development 
of such a computational forecasting framework. For this reason, tasks should be developed both at empirical 
and modeling levels and with resources including a collaborative team of experts in an interdisciplinary 
atmosphere, forecasting technologies combined with the science of networks in order to validate the results 
obtained. In this way, the following insights can be implemented. 
 1) In contrast with a majority view of the current understanding, the global industrial, economic, 
financial and ecological systems are complex in which (a) micro and macro behavior can be dramatically 
different, (b) density and heterogeneity of the links as well as the whole topology (clusters, cycles and other 
patterns) may play a role on the (in)stability of the system and (c) time evolution is crucial for spillover effects 
and externalities to cascade across the system. In this context, equilibrium approaches deliver useful but 
insufficient and sometimes fundamentally misleading and dangerous insights.
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 2) It is useful  to develop an integrated micro-macro approach including an analysis of a mesoscopic 
scale in which the system under study is seen as a network of different sectors (e.g. business lines such as 
commercial banks, investment banks, mutual  funds, insurance companies, etc.) with a varying degree of 
interdependence among them.
 3) One can leverage the deep knowledge recently gained by the complex networks community about 
failure cascades (Buldyrev et al., 2010) and contagion in networks, 
  4) It is necessary to go beyond the idea, dominant for long times, that big crises need big shocks and 
offer quantitative understanding of endogenous mechanisms of onset and amplification of crises. In this view, 
systemic risk is fundamentally different and possibly at odds with individual  risk (e.g Morris and Shin 2008, 
Brunnermeier 2009). In particular, local  shocks can also have systemic  repercussions (Delli  Gatti  et al. 2005, 
Iori et al. 2008; Battiston et al 2007; Sieczka, Sornette and Holyst, 2011).
In the economic and financial applications, the list can be enhanced by the following objectives.
 5) A necessary goal is to challenge the mainstream economics vision that more links (and thus 
interdependence) make always the economy more stable (Allen and Gale, 2000; Shiller, 2004; 2008; Merton 
and Bodie, 2005). Unfortunately, under some not so infrequent circumstances, financial integration may 
increase systemic  risk  (Lorenz and Battiston 2008; Battiston et al 2009). More generally, it has been shown 
that stronger coupling leads to increased risks of synchronization and to the occurrence of system-wide 
catastrophes (Sornette, 1994; Osorio et al., 2010). Such events have been termed “dragon-kings” to 
emphasize their special impact and the specific  generating mechanisms (Sornette, 2009; Sornette and 
Ouillon, 2012).
 6) A promising approach is to combine Minsky (1982)'s view, currently under re-evaluation, of an 
endogenous build-up of financial fragility in the economy with a network approach. As a result, the extent of 
the systemic repercussions at the Minsky moment depends not only on the distribution of fragility across the 
agents but also on the structure of their network of mutual financial exposures.
 7) It is important to complement the panorama of projects trying to identify precursors of crises from 
stock prices dynamics, by focusing instead on the network of exposures among financial institutions which 
play a crucial role in the spreading out financial distress, both in the Money Market (e.g., interbank, Repo, 
and so on, with maturity < 1 year), in the Capital Market (e.g., bonds, long-term loans, etc. > 1 year) and 
possibly in the OTC derivatives market.
 
7- CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ideally, an individual, a group or a society would like to be optimized fully for the present, enjoying now the 
comfort resulting from past achievements and investments while, at the same time, be prepared for the 
inevitable future stressors that are difficult to foresee. The concept of resilience embodies the quest towards 
the ability to sustain shocks, be they externally or internally generated or both, to suffer from these shocks as 
little as possible, for the shortest time possible, and to recover with the full functionalities that existed before 
the perturbation. Building up resilience is, like risk management, confronted with the eternal conflict between 
the long-term benefits and the short-term costs. Indeed, building up resilience is costly, as it swallows 
resources that would otherwise be directed towards optimal  present output. And like in risk management, the 
benefits are visible only when a serious crisis hits the system, which sometimes occur only over time scales 
of decades. The level of efforts towards resilience can thus be seen to be fundamentally anchored in a kind 
of philosophical perspective of one’s personal life for the individual, or a choice of culture or of society for the 
larger group. Building up resilience can ultimately be seen as a problem of decision making in the face of 
conflicting evidence and goals as well  as limited strengths in the presence of a complex stochastic 
environment, with all its complexity and entanglement with all  other aspects of life and society. It is a balance 
between the present versus the future, between commitment for costly investments versus present 
enjoyments. Yukalov and Sornette (2012) have recently shown that self-organization in complex systems 
can be treated as decision making (as it is performed by humans) and, vice versa, decision making is 
nothing but a kind of self-organization in the decision maker nervous systems. Framing the build-up of 
resilience as a dynamical and continuous decision making process offers novel perspectives, which beg to 
be explored, based on the bridge between complex pattern formation and evolutionary emergence of novel 
properties. 
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